Implications of Multiple Concurrent Pay Comparisons for Top-Team Turnover (Record no. 48530)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | nam a22 7a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20171102155017.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 171101b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Ridge, Jason W. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 28277 |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Implications of Multiple Concurrent Pay Comparisons for Top-Team Turnover |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 671-690 p. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | This article relies on tournament and social comparison theorizing to understand how multiple concurrent pay structures and, thus, potential for comparison to multiple referents, affect turnover in the CEO’s top team. Specifically, we explore how the concurrent effects of pay dispersion within the CEO’s top team, pay disparity between the team and the CEO, and pay level in comparison to top teams at other firms in the industry affect turnover among members of the CEO’s top team. Consistent with social comparison theorizing, we find that pay dispersion is positively associated with turnover within CEO’s top teams. We also find that pay disparity has an effect consistent with tournament theorizing in which firms with greater tournament prizes (i.e., CEO salary gap) have lower turnover within their CEOs’ top teams. Furthermore, we find that pay disparity interacts with both pay dispersion and pay level to affect turnover within CEOs’ top teams. These results have theoretical and practical implications for CEOs’ top-team pay design in organizations. Specifically, our findings imply that theoretical mechanisms associated with how firms compensate executives—and the inherent comparisons in which those pay structures result—work in concert to affect turnover within the CEO’s top team. Hence, to understand the effect that compensation has on executives’ subsequent responses, researchers and practitioners must consider multiple concurrent pay references simultaneously. |
| 653 ## - INDEX TERM--UNCONTROLLED | |
| Uncontrolled term | Turnover |
| Uncontrolled term | Tournament Theory, |
| Uncontrolled term | Social Comparison Theory |
| Uncontrolled term | Inequity |
| Uncontrolled term | Pay Disparity |
| Uncontrolled term | Pay Dispersion |
| 773 0# - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Host Biblionumber | 29017 |
| Host Itemnumber | 65528 |
| Main entry heading | DEBORAH E. RUPP |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | WEST LAFAYETTE SAGE PUBLICATION 2012 |
| Other item identifier | 5557180 |
| Title | JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT |
| International Standard Serial Number | 0149-2063 |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Materials specified | Volume: 43 issue: 3, page(s): 671-690 |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0149206314539349">http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0149206314539349</a> |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Source of classification or shelving scheme | Dewey Decimal Classification |
| Koha item type | Journal Article |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Date acquired | Total Checkouts | Full call number | Barcode | Date last seen | Price effective from |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dewey Decimal Classification | Main Library | Main Library | 01/11/2017 | Vol 43, Issue 2\ 5557180JA2 | 5557180JA2 | 01/11/2017 | 01/11/2017 |