The Interactive Effect of Monitoring and Incentive Alignment on Agency Costs (Record no. 52441)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01931nam a2200217 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190819144728.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 190819b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Martin, Geoffrey P. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 34220 |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | The Interactive Effect of Monitoring and Incentive Alignment on Agency Costs |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 701-727 p. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | The effectiveness of monitoring and incentive alignment as mechanisms for controlling agency costs have been explored separately and in combination, with monitoring substituting for weaknesses in incentive alignment and vice versa; this equates to positive substitution when describing how monitoring and incentive alignment interact to influence shareholder agency costs. We draw upon behavioral agency theory and findings from finance research to offer further theoretical insight into how these mechanisms interact to influence agency costs. Our results suggest that CEO earnings management aimed at preserving their equity wealth (an incentive alignment mechanism) is accentuated by higher levels of concentrated institutional ownership, thereby imposing agency costs on less informed investors. Thus, in addition to being substitutes in controlling agency costs, as previously suggested, monitoring may accentuate the perverse effects of incentive alignment, equating to negative reinforcement, rather than positive substitution. Yet this effect is negated in the absence of CEO power due to dual occupation of the board and CEO roles. We discuss implications of these findings for theory and practice |
| 653 ## - INDEX TERM--UNCONTROLLED | |
| Uncontrolled term | Agency Theory |
| Uncontrolled term | Executive Compensation |
| Uncontrolled term | CEO Decision Making |
| Uncontrolled term | Incentive Alignment |
| 700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Wiseman, Robert M. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 34221 |
| Personal name | Mejia, Luis R. Gomez- |
| 9 (RLIN) | 27514 |
| 773 0# - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Host Biblionumber | 29017 |
| Host Itemnumber | 74520 |
| Main entry heading | DEBORAH E. RUPP |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | WEST LAFAYETTE SAGE PUBLICATION 2012 |
| Other item identifier | 55510279 |
| Title | JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT |
| International Standard Serial Number | 0149-2063 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Source of classification or shelving scheme | Dewey Decimal Classification |
| Koha item type | Journal Article |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Date acquired | Total Checkouts | Full call number | Barcode | Date last seen | Price effective from |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dewey Decimal Classification | Main Library | Main Library | 19/08/2019 | Vol 45, Issue 2/ 55510279JA13 | 55510279JA13 | 19/08/2019 | 19/08/2019 |