Shareholder Influence on Joint Venture Exploration (Record no. 53325)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02107nam a2200229 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20200107181733.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 200107b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Connelly, Brian L. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 35660 |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Shareholder Influence on Joint Venture Exploration |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 3178-3203 p. |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE | |
| Title | Jouirnal of Management Vol |
| Volume number/sequential designation | 45(8). |
| 9 (RLIN) | 35658 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | In this study, we theorize about how different types of institutional investors influence firms’ choice of exploration versus exploitation for their joint ventures (JVs). Exploratory JVs engender risk, uncertain outcomes, and ex post contractual updating, whereas exploitative JVs allow for ex ante contracts. We argue that dedicated institutional investors (DIIs), who maintain concentrated holdings over time regardless of current earnings, offer tolerance for failure and reward for long-term success that encourages managerial choice of exploratory JVs. Transient institutional investors (TIIs), who trade frequently based on near-term performance metrics, prefer ex ante contracts and use exit to discipline managers who do not meet their short-term performance objectives. This suggests that TIIs may influence managers to reduce the extent to which they choose exploratory (as opposed to exploitative) JVs. Furthermore, we argue that the transactional governance of TIIs gives way to the relational monitoring of DIIs when both types of shareholders are present. As a result, the likelihood of choosing exploration, versus exploitation, as a JV formation strategy is greatest in the presence of high DII and TII ownership. We examine JVs among S&P 500 firms over the years 2000 to 2010, and results largely support our theory. |
| 653 ## - INDEX TERM--UNCONTROLLED | |
| Uncontrolled term | exploration/exploitation |
| Uncontrolled term | strategic alliances / JVs |
| Uncontrolled term | corporate governance |
| 700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Shi, Wei |
| 9 (RLIN) | 27606 |
| 710 ## - ADDED ENTRY--CORPORATE NAME | |
| Corporate name or jurisdiction name as entry element | Hoskisson, Robert E. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 35661 |
| Corporate name or jurisdiction name as entry element | Koka, Balaji R. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 35662 |
| 773 0# - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Host Biblionumber | 29017 |
| Host Itemnumber | 78120 |
| Main entry heading | DEBORAH E. RUPP |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | WEST LAFAYETTE SAGE PUBLICATION 2012 |
| Other item identifier | 55511387 |
| Title | JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT |
| International Standard Serial Number | 0149-2063 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Source of classification or shelving scheme | Dewey Decimal Classification |
| Koha item type | Journal Article |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Date acquired | Total Checkouts | Full call number | Barcode | Date last seen | Price effective from |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dewey Decimal Classification | Main Library | Main Library | 07/01/2020 | Vol 45, Issue 8/ 55511387JA5 | 55511387JA5 | 07/01/2020 | 07/01/2020 |