Signalling Roles of Prestigious Auditors and Underwriters in an Emerging IPO Market
Material type: TextDescription: 48–68 PSubject(s): In: BANIK, ARINDAM GLOBAL BUSINESS REVIEWSummary: This study examines the signalling roles of auditors’ and underwriters’ reputation and its interacted effects on the initial public offering (IPO) initial returns before, during and after the Global Financial Crisis in an emerging market. Cross-sectional data comprising of 228 IPOs from the Malaysian Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia) is used for the period 2005–2012. The ordinary least square method using multiple linear regressions is used to test the hypotheses. The findings indicate that both auditors’ and underwriters’ reputation plays a significant role in reducing asymmetric information and signals firm value to the potential investors. Auditors’ reputation documents a positive relationship, whilst the underwriters’ reputation indicates a negative relationship. The interacted signalling variables indicate that underwriters’ reputation plays a dominant role in assisting potential investors in their investment decision-making.Item type | Current library | Call number | Vol info | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Journal Article | Main Library | Vol 19, No 1/5558623JA5 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 5558623JA5 | |||||
Journals and Periodicals | Main Library On Display | JP/GEN/Vol 19, No 1/5558623 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Vol 19, No 1 (10/01/2018) | Not for loan | February, 2018 | 5558623 |
This study examines the signalling roles of auditors’ and underwriters’ reputation and its interacted effects on the initial public offering (IPO) initial returns before, during and after the Global Financial Crisis in an emerging market. Cross-sectional data comprising of 228 IPOs from the Malaysian Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia) is used for the period 2005–2012. The ordinary least square method using multiple linear regressions is used to test the hypotheses. The findings indicate that both auditors’ and underwriters’ reputation plays a significant role in reducing asymmetric information and signals firm value to the potential investors. Auditors’ reputation documents a positive relationship, whilst the underwriters’ reputation indicates a negative relationship. The interacted signalling variables indicate that underwriters’ reputation plays a dominant role in assisting potential investors in their investment decision-making.
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