000			01879nam a2200217 4500
999			_c52893 _d52893
003			OSt
005			20191121151419.0
008			191121b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBansal, Shashank, _935024
245			_aDoes Board Composition Matter to Institutional Investors?
300			_a238S-266S p.
520			_aThis study examines the resource dependency and signalling role of independent directors from the perspective of institutional investor’s and also investigates if the presence of large blockholder moderates the signalling effect. This study uses the quasi-natural experiment to examine this relationship. The difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis of 5,298 firm observations covering 618 National Stock Exchange (NSE) listed Indian firms for the period 2001–2011 provides empirical evidence that board composition does matter to institutional investors. We find that non-compliant firms who adopted the board independence requirement experience a significant increase in institutional ownership relative to previously compliant firms. We also find that institutional investors have invested more in family-owned firms during post-mandate period compared to government-, private- and foreign-owned firms. Overall, this study contributes to the existing literature on resource dependency theory and signalling theory and shows that the board independence acts as a signal to institutional investors and decreases the agency cost and cost of monitoring.
653			_aBoard composition
653			_aindependent directors
653			_ainstitutional investors
653			_acorporate governance
653			_asignalling theory
653			_aresource dependency theory
773	0		_029445 _977278 _aGANGOPADHYAY, SHUBHASIS _dNEW DELHI SAGE PUBLICATION PVT. LTD. _o55511089 _tJOURNAL OF EMERGING MARKET FINANCE _x0972-6527
942			_2ddc _cJA-ARTICLE