000			01390nam a2200217 4500
999			_c53209 _d53209
003			OSt
005			20191213125523.0
008			191212b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aPandey, Ashish _935353
245			_aHigh bids and low recovery: A possible case for non-performing loan auctions in India
300			_a250-249 p.
520			_aThis paper considers the possibility that the prices bid by asset reconstruction companies in India under a security receipt mechanism may not reflect the ultimate recoverable value of non-performing loans. The paper establishes, using a model and simulations, that the price bid by asset reconstruction companies will reveal their own rational interest and can significantly exceed the recoverable value. The conclusions arrived at in this paper raise concerns regarding the use of auction bids as an indicator of fair value on banks’ financial statements. The paper offers certain recommendations to mitigate the impact of an erroneous auction design.
653			_aNon-performing loans
653			_aAsset reconstruction companies
653			_aContingent payment auctions
653			_aFair value accounting
653			_aPrincipal agency conflict
653			_aIndian NPA crises
773	0		_026346 _977275 _aRAVI aNSHUMAN V. _dBANGOLRE IIM BANGALORE 2011 _o55511085 _tIIMB Management Review _x09793896
942			_2ddc _cJA-ARTICLE