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100			_aConnelly, Brian L. _935660
245			_aShareholder Influence on Joint Venture Exploration
300			_a3178-3203 p.
440			_a Jouirnal of Management Vol _v45(8). _935658
520			_aIn this study, we theorize about how different types of institutional investors influence firms’ choice of exploration versus exploitation for their joint ventures (JVs). Exploratory JVs engender risk, uncertain outcomes, and ex post contractual updating, whereas exploitative JVs allow for ex ante contracts. We argue that dedicated institutional investors (DIIs), who maintain concentrated holdings over time regardless of current earnings, offer tolerance for failure and reward for long-term success that encourages managerial choice of exploratory JVs. Transient institutional investors (TIIs), who trade frequently based on near-term performance metrics, prefer ex ante contracts and use exit to discipline managers who do not meet their short-term performance objectives. This suggests that TIIs may influence managers to reduce the extent to which they choose exploratory (as opposed to exploitative) JVs. Furthermore, we argue that the transactional governance of TIIs gives way to the relational monitoring of DIIs when both types of shareholders are present. As a result, the likelihood of choosing exploration, versus exploitation, as a JV formation strategy is greatest in the presence of high DII and TII ownership. We examine JVs among S&P 500 firms over the years 2000 to 2010, and results largely support our theory.
653			_aexploration/exploitation
653			_a strategic alliances / JVs
653			_acorporate governance
700			_aShi, Wei _927606
710			_aHoskisson, Robert E. _935661
710			_aKoka, Balaji R. _935662
773	0		_029017 _978120 _aDEBORAH E. RUPP _dWEST LAFAYETTE SAGE PUBLICATION 2012 _o55511387 _tJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT _x 0149-2063
942			_2ddc _cJA-ARTICLE